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1. MODULES AND INTERFACES 
The very notion of an interface presupposes the existence of clearly definable and 
separable components ("modules") between which this interface mediates. The 
components at issue here are syntax and morphology. Conventional wisdom tells us 
that morphology deals with the internal structure of words, and syntax with the way 
in which words are combined to larger units. Neither Zwicky nor Bierwisch cast any 
doubt on the principled nature of this distinction between morphology and syntax; 
but they provide us with numerous examples which might nurture such a doubt. Take 
Bierwisch's analysis of German verb clusters, according to which these clusters are 
formed by a "quasi-morphological process": "(...) complex verbs must be considered 
as boundary phenomena between syntax and morphology, such that verb cluster 
formation is only a quasi-morphological process" (p. 192). This means, among other 
things, that elements can be moved out of such a "complex word", as in (cf. 
Bierwisch's (67a)): 
(1) a. Er hätte ihn das Buch lesen sehen können 
he had him the book read see can 
"He would have been able to see him read the book" 
b. Lesen sehen hätte er ihn das Buch können 
read see had he him the book can 
c. weil er ihn das Buch hätte lesen sehen können 
because he him the book had read see can 
In which sense, then, is an entity like "hat gehen lassen wollen" a word? Bierwisch 
lists a number of syntactic properties which it shares with simple verbs (i.e., words), 
whereas there are other properties which it shares with phrases. Could it be that there 
is simply no sharp distinction between a component called "morphology" and a 
component called "syntax"? And hence that "interface" is the wrong metaphor for 
what mediates between these two components? There is no shore line but an 
extended swamp between land and sea where the liquid and the solid are mixed. Not 
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an attractive idea for a linguist. I will leave this point open for the moment and turn 
to Zwicky who, albeit more in passing, suggests a possible analysis of these 
constructions in his terms. An entity such as "hätte lesen sehen können" clearly 
violates Zwicky's "Intervention Constraint type III", hence it is not a "moreme", a 
morphological word in his sense. But it still could be a "syntactic word", a minimal 
entity on the token level, and in fact, this is the analysis suggested by Zwicky: "In 
all of these examples [including Bierwisch's "verb clusters", W.K.], what I am 
proposing is that some combination of material acts as a W syntactically. There is 
no necessary claim that such a combination instantiates a moreme; being word-like 
syntactically does not entail being word-like morphologically, though the standard 
situation is of course for a W to instantiate a moreme." (section 3.3). But this would 
only apply to the verb cluster in (c), whereas in (la) and in (lb), the "combination 
of material" is distributed over (minimally) two words. And even in the case of (1c), 
it remains open whether the entire cluster "hätte lesen sehen können" corresponds 
to a syntactic word, since Zwicky (quite understandably) gives no criteria for what 
should be understood by a "syntactic word in German". 
The example illustrates a more general point. Whilst most linguists, including 
myself, would like to believe that there are two distinct and clearly separable 
components of grammar, "morphology" and "syntax", which interact at some point, 
closer inspection of even the most common constructions blurs this distinction, and 
hence the very notion of "modular organisation", and interfaces between modules, 
of grammar. Over the past years, numerous arguments have been given that complex 
words have an internal structure which parallels phrase structure in many ways (the 
contributions to this volume provide many examples). But what is then the difference 
between composition beneath the X0-level and above the X0-level? Is there any 
principled distinction at all? And still worse: What entitles us to call some compound 
entity "X0", rather than, for example, "X2"? Why, for example, would most linguists 
say that the sequence of morphemes between determiner and auxiliary is a word in 
(2a), but rather some kind of phrase in (2b): 
(2) a. Das Geworfen-Sein-in-das-Da ist unser Los 
The being-thrown-into-the-Here is our fate 
b. Das Werfen mit Steinen ist verboten 
The throwing with stones is forbidden 
Examples of this type, and they are abundant, show that the criterion cannot be 
complexity. Nor can it be recursion, since mere is no rule-based end to compounds 
like "antidisestablishmentarianism" or, in German, which is notorious for these 
constructions, "Donaudampfschifffahrtsgesellschaftskapitän". 
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2. WORDS ARE NUTS 
Like a nut, a word may have a rich inner content; but the content is somehow 
encapsulated. The access to the structured interior is constrained. In particular, it is 
not selective: adjectives, adverbs or other modifying elements, when applied to a 
word, do not access just parts of the interior: they affect it as a whole. Bierwisch's 
case for the word-nature of German verb-clusters crucially hinges on this notion (see 
the argument in his section 2). Negation, for example, affects the entire cluster in 
much the same way in which it would affect a single word. (One might doubt this 
particular claim, since it is possible to limit the scope of the negation to one 
component, say "gehen" in (1), by giving it intonational prominence; but this does 
not affect the general point). Similarly, words have only limited "exits": Verbs, 
simple or compound, regularly have valencies, i.e., they require certain arguments 
around them. But these valencies come uniformly from the entire word, rather than 
from one of its components. Again, Bierwisch uses this as an argument for the 
wordhood of verb clusters: "a verb cluster created by functional composition behaves 
(...) like a single, but internally complex verb whose argument structure is derived 
from that of its constituent parts" (p.3). Much the same idea of words being 
somehow structured but encapsulated underlies Zwicky's various "Intervention 
constraints": Their common denominator is the fact that they all forbid some material 
to pierce the nutshell and to separate parts of its interior. 
This notion of an "encapsulated structure" is compatible with the idea that the 
very same organisational principles obtain within the word and between words. What 
is constrained, are the relations from the structured interior of one word to the 
structured interior of another word. 
Is such a view (which one would have to make more precise by defining the 
constraints on possible interrelations) correct? Probably not. A first problematic case 
are agglutinating languages, in which a "word" may simply embody all of the 
structural relations of an entire sentence, and parts of such a word can selectively be 
accessed by other words. But there are even elementary constructions in languages 
like English, for which such a neat separation between word-internal syntax 
("morphology") and word-external syntax ("syntax" in the usual sense) is problema-
tic. In what follows, I will briefly discuss such a case. Others are easily imaginable. 
3. POSTLEXICAL MORPHOLOGY 
In the following utterances 
(3) a. He seems to remember 
b. He seemed to remember 
the epistemic verb is marked for tense, the infinitive complement is not. Never-
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theless, we understand his remembering to be around the time of utterance TU in 
(3a), and before TU in (3b). Nothing in the infinitive complement itself tells us this. 
The infinitive "to remember" is neutral with respect to temporal reference. The time 
at which we understand the remembering to occur is somehow transferred from the 
time of the finite verb. Apparently, there is a general principle, which I will call 
"temporal congruency". It says that T(FIN), the time of the tensed verb, is 
transported to the verb in the infinitival complement. (It should be clear that this 
exposition of "temporal congruency" is a considerable simplification; for example, 
there are other verbs, such as "to promise", for which temporal congruency is 
different; but this does not concern our present argument). We may depict this as 
follows ("tc with [ ]" stands for "is temporally congruent with [ ]"): 
(3) c. T(FIN) tc with [ remember ] 
If we want to express that the time of the finite verb falls into the posttime of the 
remembering, then we have to apply a "posttime operator" (PT) to the latter. In 
English (and similarly in Dutch, German, Latin and many other languages), this is 
done by perfect marking: 
(4) a. He seems to [have remembered] 
b. He seemed to [have remembered] 
Temporal congruency then assigns "present" to [have remembered], i.e., to the 
posttime of remembering, in (4a); it means that one has right now the impression 
that he is in the posttime of remembering, hence was in the state of remembering at 
some earlier time. And in (4b), temporal congruency assigns "past" to [have 
remembered], i.e., the posttime of remembering: in the past, one had the impression 
that he was in the posttime of remembering; hence, the remembering itself was at 
some still earlier time. Again, we may depict the situation as follows: 
(4) c. T(FIN) tc with [ PT(remember)] 
The expression of PT in English combines morphological and syntactical devices -
inflection of the verb and the infinitival auxiliary "to have". One might argue that 
the latter is also "quasi-morphological". Bierwisch suggests this in the parallel case 
of German. But this is arguable in the case of English were a negation can intervene 
("He seems to have never remembered"). We shall leave this open, since it is not 
really relevant to the point. (The very same argument could be made for Latin 
infinitival complements, such as "laboravisse videtur", which are clearly only 
morphological.) 
The point is this: What happens if we expand the complement by a temporal 
adverbial? Adding such an adverb, like "yesterday", is clearly not morphological but 
a free syntactic operation: 
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(5) He seems to have remembered yesterday 
The question is now: Does T(yesterday) - the time expressed by "yesterday" -
specify the time of his remembering, or the posttime of his remembering? In other 
words, do we have (6a) or (6b): 
(6) a. T(FIN) tc with [yesterday (PT (remember))] 
b. T(FIN) tc with [PT (yesterday (remember))] 
Clearly, the latter is the case. It is not excluded that also part of the posttime falls 
into yesterday; but this is due to the particular example; if we narrow down the time 
of the temporal adverbial (for example by "yesterday at midday"), then reading (6a) 
is possible. 
This means that the syntactic operation indeed pierces the nutshell: it has access 
not to the word "remembered" (or even "to have remembered") as a whole but to 
a selected part of its inner structure - it modifies "remember" - but not "remem-
bered". Note that the latter possibility is not ruled out by semantic or by pragmatic 
reasons: the posttime of remembering is a time as well, and there is no reason why 
it should be impossible to specify this time by "yesterday" or by "yesterday at 
midday". 
One straightforward way to describe these facts is to assume that morphological 
operations can be postlexical, i.e., apply after syntactic operations. In the above 
example, we may assume that first the syntactic operation "Add adverbial" applies 
to the verb "remember" and yields "remember yesterday". The posttime operator 
applies to the result of this syntactic operation and yields an inflected form. This 
gives us immediately the desired result. 
The stipulation of postlexical morphology may seem to be a high price. But if we 
assume that there are ready-made lexical forms like "remembered" - or even "to 
have remembered" -, which are generated by lexicon-internal morphological 
processes and then passed on to syntax, then the price is much higher. It would force 
us to assume that common syntactic rules, such as the addition of temporal adverbial, 
operate into words, rather than on words. Furthermore, it would make constructions 
as common as "He seems to have remembered yesterday" non-compositional. And 
this seems even less desirable. 
